Flexibility - flexicurity - flexinsurance: response to the European Commission's Green Paper "Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century" by Tangian, Andranik
www.ssoar.info
Flexibility - flexicurity - flexinsurance: response
to the European Commission's Green Paper
"Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of
the 21st century"
Tangian, Andranik
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Tangian, A. (2007). Flexibility - flexicurity - flexinsurance: response to the European Commission's Green Paper
"Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century". (WSI-Diskussionspapier, 149). Düsseldorf:
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut in der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-321032
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  
 
 
Flexibility–Flexicurity–Flexinsurance:        
Response to the European Commission's 
Green Paper "Modernising Labour Law to 
Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century"1
 
Andranik Tangian 
 
WSI-Diskussionspapier Nr. 149 
 
January 2007 
 
 
 
Privatdozent Dr., Dr. Sc. Andranik Tangian 
WSI in der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung 
Hans-Böckler-Straße 39 
D-40476 Düsseldorf, Germany 
Tel. +49 211 7778-0 
Fax +49 211 7778-190 
andranik-tangian@boeckler.de 
 
WSI-Diskussionspapier (Print)  ISSN 1861-0625 
WSI-Diskussionspapier (Internet) ISSN 1861-0633 
http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_wsi_diskp_149_e.pdf 
 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut 
in der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Düsseldorf 
                                                 
1 Based on the paper presented at the IG Metall Frankfurt am Main, on January 23, 2007, within the 
debate initiated by the Green Paper of the European Commission (2006a). The author thanks the 
organizer of the meeting Horst Mund for a stimulating discussion, colleagues Stefanie Kremer, Nadine 
Zeibig, and Till Müller-Schoell for thoroughly reading successive versions of the paper, important 
remarks, and valuable suggestions which contributed both to content and style.  
  2
Abstract 
The paper contains both critical remarks on and constructive suggestions to Green Paper: 
Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century of the European 
Commission (2006a) which promotes flexicurity policies, that is, relaxing the employment 
protection legislation while providing advances in employment and social security for flexible 
workforces, like fixed-term, part-time and agency workers, or self-employed. The default 
assumption, that relaxing labour laws can be compensated by these advances, is criticised. 
These measures are regarded as too vague and insufficient, as also demonstrated in our 
previous study with empirical evidence.  
Therefore, some additional measures are proposed to counterbalance the actual flexibilization 
of employment relations, including (1) flexinsurance, a kind of progressive flexibilization tax, 
meaning that the employer's contribution to social security should be proportional to the 
flexibility of the contract/risk of becoming unemployed, (2) elements of the basic minimum 
income model, (3) constraining financial markets, as well as (4) developing adequate policy 
monitoring/evaluation instruments. It is argued that all of these meet interests of social 
partners and solve contradictions between such European policies as flexicurity, make work 
pay, welfare-state policy, and civil-society policy.  
Finally, we provide specific thoughts to 14 questions posed by the Green Paper. 
Keywords: Flexicurity, labour market flexibility, social security, labour law, European 
employment strategy, Green Paper. 
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Introduction: The Green Paper 
The Green Paper: Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century of the 
European Commission (2006a) has been issued on November 22, 2006. Additionally to a 
fluent text it contains 14 questions in boxes. They are aimed at initiating an open internet 
debate (closing date March 31, 2007) on legislating the flexicurity labour market policy, that 
is, relaxing the employment protection legislation while providing advances in employment 
and social security for flexible workforces, like fixed-term, part-time and agency workers, or 
self-employed, as well as labour market outsiders. The results of the debate will be reflected 
in a Commission Communication on flexicurity to be presented in June 2007, 'which will set 
out to develop the arguments in favour of the "flexicurity" approach and to outline a set of 
common principles by the end of 2007 to help Member States steer the reform efforts' 
(European Commission 2006a: 4–5). 
The Green Paper adduces three reference examples: 'the Dutch Flexibility and Security Act 
1999, the Austrian Severance Act (Abfertigungsrecht) 2002 and the June 2006 Spanish decree 
easing the conversion of temporary labour contracts into open-ended labour contracts with 
reduced dismissal costs' (European Commission 2006a: 10). These reforms enhance labour 
market flexibility, in particular make dismissals easier, and at the same time provide some 
advantages for certain types of employees; see EIRO (2007) for details. These examples 
should additionally convince other Member States to pursue the flexicurity policy and to 
implement corresponding legislation reforms. 
First of all it should be noted that the Green Paper is written in a particular way, channelling 
the debate towards certain conclusions. It presents the current deregulation of European 
labour market as a necessity by default, so that the only question to be discussed is how to 
relax the legislation to facilitate a further employment flexibilization. Social measures get 
much less attention.   
However, the need for flexibilization of employment relations is not that evident. Neither it is 
clear from the Green Paper’s preamble. For instance, why does globalization imply 'the 
shortening of the investment horizon' and 'the increasing demand shifts' which condition the 
need for flexibilization (European Commission 2006a: 5)? Conversely, globalization as a 
long-term world-wide trend should guarantee long perspectives and stable demand.  
Or, is 'sustainable growth with more and better jobs' (European Commission 2006a: 3) really 
attainable due to flexibilization? In fact, sustainable growth means a non-inflationary 
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development so much cared of by the European Central Bank. According to the Philips 
economic law of inflation–employment proportionality, a low inflation is attainable at the 
price of high unemployment. Then, if 'sustainable growth', where is the room for 'more and 
better jobs'? Isn't the flexibilization necessary for 'sustainable growth' just a substitute for 
latent unemployment and underpaid work? 
Or, if the European Commission advocates for flexibilization, why doesn’t it provide an 
example itself by moving its permanent full-time staff to flexible contracts? Following the 
Green Paper's logic, then it could better meet 'the challenge of adapting to change' by 'just-in-
time management' and 'foster the creativity of the whole workforce' (European Commission 
2006a: 5).  
These and other inconsistencies evoke doubts in the real necessity of flexibilization. At the 
same time the actual European trends significantly deviate from the concept of flexicurity 
intended. There are several causes:  
• lack of global political course, 
• contradictory social interests,  
• inconsistent European policies, 
• limitations of legislation alone to regulate flexible work, 
• lack of efficient steering instruments,   
• methodological gaps, and lack of adequate monitoring tools. 
Taking into account all these deficiencies, the legislation changes advocated by the Green 
Paper look insufficiently motivated and little coordinated with social partners. Further 
deregulation measures in the near future are suggested to adopt under vague promises to 
improve employment and social security which can take years and which effects are not yet 
clear.  
The paper begins with a brief history of flexicurity and then analyses the above enumerated 
causes of its inappropriate implementation, devoting a separate section to each item. Critics 
are combined with constructive proposals which may be useful for further policy design. 
Finally, specific thoughts to the 14 questions posed by the Green Paper are provided. 
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A brief history of flexicurity 
In the larger part of post-war Europe employment relations were regulated by rather 
constraining employment protection legislation and collective agreements. The contradiction 
between the flexibilization pursued by employers and labour market regulation defended by 
trade unions made topical the discussion on flexibilization and employment protection 
legislation with regard to economical performance and unemployment.  
The advantages and disadvantages of labour market regulation/flexibility versus employment 
were investigated in the two-volume Jobs Study by the OECD (1994), containing 'evidence 
and explanation' in favour of relaxing employment protection. It evoked numerous responses 
from scholars; for a review focusing on European welfare states see Esping-Andersen 
(2000a–b). As concluded by Esping-Andersen (2000b: 99), 'the link between labour market 
regulation and employment is hard to pin down'. Under certain model assumptions, the same 
empirical evidence, that unemployment is practically independent of the strictness of 
employment protection legislation, was reported also by the OECD (1999: 47–132). There are 
even cases when the same legislative changes caused different effects. For instance, the 
impact of almost equal deregulation measures on the use of fixed-term contracts 'was sharply 
different' in Germany and Spain (OECD 1999: 71).  
At the same time, a good labour market performance under little regulation was inherent in 
the Anglo-Saxon model, that is, USA, Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia (OECD 1994, 
Esping-Andrsen 2000a). The deregulation of labour market in the Netherlands, which had a 
different kind of economy, coincided with the 'Dutch miracle' of the 1990s (Visser and 
Hemerijck 1997, Gorter 2000, van Oorschot 2001). A similar Danish practice in the 
background of 'Eurosclerosis' (Esping-Andersen 2000a: 67) was successful as well (Björklund 
2000, Braun 2001, Madsen 2003 and 2004). All of these convinced some scholars and 
politicians in the harmlessness and even usefulness of labour market deregulation. It was 
believed that employment flexibility improved competitiveness of firms and thereby 
stimulated production, which in turn stimulated labour markets; for criticism on this 
viewpoint see Coats (2006).  
The claims for flexibilization met a hard resistance, especially in countries with old traditions 
of struggle for labour rights. Wilthagen and Tros (2004: 179) reported with a reference to 
Korver (2001) that the Green Paper: Partnership for a New Organisation of Work of the 
European Commission (1997) 'which promoted the idea of social partnership and balancing 
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flexibility and security' got a very negative response from French and German trade unions, 
because 'the idea of partnership represents a threat to the independence of unions and a denial 
of the importance of worker’s rights and positions, notably at the enterprise level'. The ILO 
published a report, concluding that 'the flexibilization of the labour market has led to a 
significant erosion of worker’s rights in fundamentally important areas which concern their 
employment and income security and (relative) stability of their working and living 
conditions' (Ozaki 1999: 116).  
To handle the growing flexibility of employment relations with lower job security and 
decreasing eligibility to social benefits, the notion of flexicurity has been introduced. The 
most cited definition of flexicurity is due to Wilthagen and Tros (2004) 
[Flexicurity is] a policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and in a deliberate way, to 
enhance the flexibility of labour markets, work organization and labour relations on the one 
hand, and to enhance security — employment security and social security — notably for weak 
groups in and outside the labour market on the other hand.  
One can simply define it, following the analogy with the motto of Prague Spring 1968 
‘socialism with a human face’: 
Flexicurity is a deregulation of labour markets (= flexibilization) with ‘a human face’, that is, 
compensated by some advantages in social security, in particular, for the groups affected. 
The main distinction captured by this simplified definition is that flexicurity differs from 
unconditional deregulation in introducing compensatory measures in social security and 
employment activation. Specific understandings (definitions) of flexicurity may depend on 
flexibilization steps suggested, tempo of deregulation, particular social advantages proposed, 
and estimates of their compensatory equivalence. A consensus in balancing these factors is 
not a pure academic question but rather an issue for bargaining between governments, 
employers, and trade unions, similarly to collective agreements. For instance, trade unionists 
define flexicurity as social protection for flexible work forces understood as "an alternative to 
pure flexibilization" (Keller and Seifert 2004: 226) but not at the price of relaxing 
employment protection of normally employed. 
Wilthagen and Tros (2004) ascribe the conception of flexicurity to a member of the Dutch 
Scientific Council of Government Policy, Professor Hans Adriaansens, and the Dutch 
Minister of Social Affairs, Ad Melkert (Labour Party). In the autumn of 1995 Adriaansens 
launched this word in speeches and interviews, having defined it as a shift from job security 
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towards employment security. He suggested compensating the decreasing job security (fewer 
permanent jobs and easier dismissals) by improving employment opportunities and social 
security. 
For instance, a relaxation of the employment protection legislation was supposed to be 
counterbalanced by providing improvements to fixed-term and part-time workers, supporting 
life-long professional training which facilitates changes of jobs, more favourable regulation of 
working time, and additional social benefits. In December 1995 Ad Melkert presented a 
memorandum Flexibility and Security, on the relaxation of the employment protection 
legislation of permanent workers, provided that fixed-term and agency workers get regular 
employment status, without however adopting the concept of flexicurity as such. By the end 
of 1997 the Dutch parliament accepted flexibility/security proposals and shaped them into the 
Dutch Flexibility and Security Act which came in force in 1999. 
The OECD (2004b: 97–98) ascribes the flexicurity to Denmark with its traditionally weak 
employment protection, highly developed social security, and easiness to find a job; see also 
Madsen (2004) and Breedgaard et al. (2005). Regardless of the priority in inventing the word 
flexicurity, both countries were recognized as 'good-practice examples' (Braun 2001, van 
Oorschot 2001, Kok et al. 2004) and inspired the international flexicurity debate. Although 
some authors still consider flexicurity a specific Dutch/Danish phenomenon (Gorter 2000), 
the idea spread all over Europe in a few years; for a selection of recent international 
contributions see Jepsen and Klammer (2004).  
At the Lisbon summit of 2000 the EU had already referred to this concept (Vielle and 
Walthery 2003: 2; Keller and Seifert 2004: 227, Kok et al. 2004), and after the meeting in 
Villach in January 2006 flexicurity became a top theme in the European Commission 
(European Commission 2006b) culminated now in the publication of the Green Paper.  
Thus, after 10 years of debate flexicurity became an official issue both of the European 
employment and social policies.  
Lack of global political course  
To better understand our view at the background motivation for flexibilization, the driving 
force of the flexicurity debate, we provide a small historical retrospective.  
The actual globalisation started in the 1970s was an extension and enforcement of the 
Western market economy as an instrument of East–West economical and political 
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competition. The opening of financial markets in the 1970–1980s was thought to improve 
living standards in industrialized countries and to solve the poverty problem in the third 
world. Investments in countries with low labour costs promised cheap goods for consumers 
and high returns for investors. At the same time, the target countries were expected to profit 
from modern technologies and job creation (World Bank 2002). Not least was enhancing the 
Western economical and political presence in developing countries.  
With the collapse of the Eastern block, the Western world lost its political opponent which in 
a sense had directed its development. As said in the novel Indecision: "During the Cold War 
you felt like you had a reason to get up in the morning. Now what have we got?" (Kunkel 
2005: 92). Before 1990s both economical and technological progress were influenced by 
national and international long-running defence programs. The society had a high degree of 
ideological consensus, understanding of military expenses, and rather common political 
values. The market economy was an efficient instrument of related policies. After the Cold 
War had been over, the Western countries continued their development with no radical 
change. As winners in the world confrontation Western democracies declared themselves 
politically best and the self-regulating market economy was recognized as most dynamical. 
However both democracy and market economy with its self-optimization properties were 
overestimated. It is often missed that the self-optimization runs under given preferences of 
politic/economic agents, so that goals play the guiding role. Having lost their ideological 
opponent and military competitor, Western democracies turned to small issues within short 
periods between successive elections. As for the economy, it is known that an optimal 
development goes along some main trajectory, whereas short programs inevitably enter and 
leave it with great losses (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). 
The coexistence of different social systems was as necessary for the world as several opposite 
parties are needed for a democratic country. Lacking any political alternative, the European 
social-democratic capitalism has shifted to the right, and this process continues. Trade unions, 
even those which did not collaborated with communists, much profited from their political 
presence with far-going claims. It worked by the same principle as formulated by the father 
from Truffault's film 400 Blows (1959): "You ask for 1000 francs, so expect 500, will be glad 
for 300, get 100."  With no communists who asked for 1000, it became difficult for trade 
unions to get even 100. For instance, in West Germany it was often said that the third side in 
collective bargaining was the DDR. 
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The response of the market with no ideological constraints and directing force was a struggle 
for resources, cheap labour and sale markets, and financial speculations with little social 
utility. For instance, yearly direct, that is, productive, international investments attained its 
absolute maximum of 1492 Bio. US dollars in 2000, which is however less than the average 
amount of daily (!) financial speculations (UNCTAD 2002: 303). It goes well in line with 
Machiavelli’s observation in The Prince that politics, lacking any guiding principle, is 
reduced to a continuous struggle for power with no moral limits. The market economy — an 
efficient weapon of the Cold War — turned against its owners after the war had been over. It 
is noteworthy that labour market deregulation reforms in Europe started in the early 1990s 
(European Commission 2006a: 5, see also Casey 2004) immediately after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  
Correspondingly, the Club of Rome foresees three scenarios of the world future 
(Radermacher 2006a–b): 
1. A big war for resources and markets with a drastic reduction of the world population 
(15% likelihood) 
2. The rich benevolently sacrifice their excessive well-being to help the poor (35% 
likelihood) 
3. The 'brasilianization' of the world, meaning that the world population splits into a 
relatively small group of rich (people, countries) and a large group of poor (50% 
likelihood). Such a society is described in the novel The Time Machine by H. W. 
Wells (1895), where the bottom class of miserable Morlocks toils maintaining the 
underground machinery that keep the upper class of Elois docile and plentiful. 
The contemporary development meets rather the third scenario (United Nations Development 
Programme 2002). During the last 30 years living standards, even in the United States, visibly 
improved exclusively for top earners: the middle class improved its welfare by 35%, whereas 
the top 0.1% multiplied it by factor 5 (Krugeman 2006). As for developing countries, the 
poverty problem was not solved and the inequality even increased (Stiglitz 2002). 
One has to distinguish between goals and instruments to attain these goals. The much 
promoted sustainable development is often presented as a goal of the European Union which, 
in particular, requires flexibilization as an instrument to attain it. However, in the perspective 
of increasing income differences, the sustainable development looks rather as an instrument 
itself. As follows from the facts mentioned, the sustainable development is aimed not only to 
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'meet the challenge of India and China' (Coats 2006: 5, 23, OECD 2005: 25, UK Presidency 
of the EU 2005) but primarily to sustain and multiply the superiority of the rich over the 
poor. Indeed, if the European well-being was higher before the 'sustainable development' and 
flexibilization, what are they for?  
All these trends are unacceptable for a large majority of population. As said by the 6th 
Director General of the UNESCO René Maheu (1966: 34) '…The man has an almost 
unlimited capacity to suffer…  It is in fact the injustice… which is intolerable". 
Thus, lacking the guiding political goal of the Cold War, the market economy started to work 
for itself, putting economic values over social ones. The worldwide increasing inequality 
shows that social priorities are considered secondary and that flexibilization of employment 
relations aimed at boosting business activities is most advantageous for owners and top 
managers. 
Contradictory social interests 
Obviously, every step towards a higher labour flexibility meets interests of employers. 
Businesses get rid of restrictions, managers improve performance by rotating and squeezing 
personnel, and firms gain higher profits. All expenses are recovered by the state — costly 
reforms and additional social security benefits. Therefore, such a flexibilization scenario turns 
out to be a long-running indirect governmental donation to firms. Since the state budget 
originates from taxpayers, the employees contribute considerably to the donation.  
An innovative feature of this type of industrial relations is an active intermediation of the 
state. Formerly capitalist industrial relations were restricted to the axis employer–employee. 
The employer purchased not result of but capacity to work, and used this device to obtain the 
surplus value, qualified by Marx as exploitation. Now the industrial relations constitute no 
longer an axis but a circle employer–employee–state–employer with a sophisticated money 
loop through legislation, social security and tax systems. The exploitation is no longer 
restricted to relations between one employer and one employee but extended to relations of all 
employers and all employees, being redistributed through all these systems. 
The globalization initiated by Western countries as an invitation to paradise is now 
transforming into an instrument of pressure. After governments had opened financial markets 
they began to warn: 'If flexibilization required by employers will not be pursued, they will 
legally increase in foreign investments and move jobs to other countries with more favourable 
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business conditions.' Moreover, several countries were rapidly integrated into the EU, 
contrary to their readiness, facilitating export of jobs there.  
How is it explained to the broad public? Sustainable development is presented as an objective 
aimed at higher living standards. Deregulation is needed to enhance the competitiveness of 
the European economy to make it more powerful. To reconcile employees with individual 
inconveniences, the catchy word-slogan flexicurity is launched (the success of this concept is 
not least due to the positively sounding word itself). Everything looks fair: one commodity 
(labour rights) is exchanged for another commodity (social security), and the exchange rate 
being negotiated.  
The bottleneck is that this apparent natural prerequisite leaves employees with no chance to 
win. In fact, the default assumption that everything can be bought and sold is not always true! 
In a sense, it is suggested that workers’ social health (= the right to remain at work) is 
exchanged for a treatment (= social care in the form of advanced social security benefits). In 
other words, give your working hand and get prosthesis instead. However: Can a prosthesis, 
whatever its value, replace a healthy hand?  
Therefore, from the viewpoint of trade unions, giving up labour rights for social benefits is 
not appropriate. Even if each particular compromise seems more or less fair, their succession 
can lead away from the social status quo and the employees can finally get nothing or very 
little for their pains. It can run as in the known tale about a man who exchanges a horse for a 
cow, then the cow for a sheep, and so on until he finds himself with nothing but a needle 
which he loses on the way home.  
Trade unions doubt that better social guarantees can adequately compensate a higher risk to 
lose a job.  The emerging disadvantages can be compensated only partially but never 
completely. Besides, entrusting the workers’ welfare to the welfare-giver, the state, is 
unreliable. Every political change may result in social cuts (as now in Germany). 
Employment protection, on the contrary, enhances job security, consequently, a stable income 
even during recessions and political crises (Bewley 1999).  
From the trade-unionist viewpoint, the sustainable development is necessary as long as it 
improves living and working conditions of employees. If under sustainable development the 
workers' well-being is not enhanced and a better labour market performance (if any) is 
attained at the price of stress and lack of confidence in the future then the sustainable 
development can be put in question. Indeed: Are higher industrial productivity and 
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competitiveness the prime human goals? Why sustainable development is put beyond social 
values? In other words, is it more important to be economically rich rather than socially 
healthy?  
If economy is not an objective but an instrument of politics, and if the sustainable 
development with obligatory flexibilization is really intended to contribute to the European 
social model then flexicurity should be implemented with clear social priorities. However, as 
follows from our empirical studies (Tangian 2005–2006), the situation is far from being 
satisfactory. Instead of advantages in social and employment security, the deregulation-only 
policy is absolutely prevailing. We conclude that the contradictory interests of social partners 
are not deliberately taken into account in the actual policy implementations. 
Perspectives of unconditional deregulation 
Let us outline briefly what can happen if the labour market deregulation in Europe will further 
remain unconstrained.  
Human resources. A further flexibilization can reduce the fraction of high qualified workers 
which skills are acquired due to long tenures. It can finally result in degradation of European 
human capital and, as its consequence, decline of quality of European products.  
Career prospects. As already mentioned, flexible employment destroys career prospects. 
Indeed, each new job means a new start, often implying a starting salary, especially if an 
employee is little experienced in new tasks. Thereby, a higher risk of interrupted employment 
under flexibilization, or changes of employer increases the risk of remaining at the bottom of 
professional hierarchy. 
Individualism and climate at work. The enhanced mobility with frequent changes of 
working teams means the non-belonging to any collective. It results in an individualistic 
psychology and no solidarity. If earnings and competitiveness are becoming the only sense of 
life, the social climate at work can hardly be good and relations between colleagues are 
unlikely to be more than formal. 
Loss of self-identification and destruction of civil society. Frequent professional 
reorientations inherent in flexible work lead to the loss of professional identity and of the 
feeling of social significance. People with no social self-identification can hardly bare social 
responsibility and are unlikely to constitute a civil society.  
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Family life. Income insecurity, mobility of the workplace, and individualistic psychology 
obviously complicate family life. If both partners are flexibly employed then the difficulties 
are multiplied. The frequent necessity of changing schools is not the best option for children 
either. Marriages which require settling down are little compatible with professional 
activities, and the marriage age grows correspondingly.  
Demography and immigration. Lowering birth quotas caused by aging marriages can create 
demographic problems. The percentage of aging population will grow, and that of employable 
population will decrease. The decreasing contributions to social security will sharpen the 
deficit of retirement funds. On the other hand, the demand for labour force will grow. In turn, 
it can stimulate additional immigration with a number of side effects. 
Increasing inequality and middle class. Destroying career prospects of employees means an 
increasing fraction of population under in-work poverty who are unable to reach the middle-
class standards. For instance, the actual German debate on poverty highlights 6.5 Mio-large 
underclass (Gammelin 2006, König 2006, Schmidt 2006). The middle class will vanish, and 
the society will fall into top and low clans with little transitions between them and sustained 
inequality. 
Thus, flexibilization is closely linked to the 'brasilianization' scenario of the Club of Rome. If 
flexibilization will not be constrained and flexicurity will not be implemented with 
appropriate social advantages, the European social model will not survive. 
Inconsistent European policies
The contradictory social interests discussed in the previous section manifest themselves in 
European policies. Namely, several European policies are hardly consistent with each other: 
European welfare policy which suggests certain living standards independent of 
employment. It assumes a stable labour market performance and is backed up by a strong 
social security system (Esping-Andersen 1990, Auer and Gazier 2002, Ramaux 2006).  
Flexibilization of employment relations (3rd guideline for European Employment Strategy; 
see European Commission 2005) is aimed at improving the competitiveness of European 
economy and sustainable development. In particular, it means a relaxation of employment 
protection legislation. This relaxation contradicts to the employment security assumed in the 
conception of welfare state. 
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Innovation policy requires a highly qualified manpower which requires long working 
experience, as opposed to short-time tenures under flexibilization. A loss of high quality of 
European products can be hardly compensated by their better quality-to-price ratio thanks to 
better firms' performance. Indeed, at the world market, the niche of highest quality-to-price 
ratio is already occupied by Asian firms, including Japan. The niche of cheap but still quality 
goods is occupied by the United States. Europe has traditionally manufactured highest quality 
products at high prices. If Europe quits its established niche, it will even more strongly 
compete with Asiatic and American firms with quite questionable outcomes, contrary to the 
Lisbon Agenda 2010.  
Flexicurity (European Commission 2006b) The above mentioned contradiction is hoped to be 
resolved by compensating the relaxation of labour protection by advances in social and 
employment security, imagined as a flexicurity trade-off.  
Make work pay (8th guideline for European Employment strategy, European Commission 
2005) is aimed at stimulating the unemployed to active labour market participation. Similarly 
to flexicurity, the 'make work pay' policy is also a trade-off, but between the social protection 
and maximizing the gain from moving to work (OECD 2004a: 92). The policy 'make work 
pay' contradicts flexicurity, because it includes reductions of security benefits which, 
according to flexicurity, should be improved.  
Improving living and working conditions (European Foundation 2007) is one of prime 
goals of the European Union. Flexibilization, however, increases the in-work poverty, and 
'make work pay' deteriorates the situation of unemployed. Working conditions and career 
prospects of flexibly employed are generally worse than that of normally employed. As has 
been mentioned, flexibilization results in individualism with a negative impact on the working 
climate. 
Family policy (European Foundation 2007) is also in the EU focus. As has been emphasized 
in the previous section, it is hardly consistent with flexible employment with high workplace 
mobility. 
Demography and immigration  The flexibilization of employment relations with its 
negative impact on family life results in lower birth quotas and aging population. The need in 
an additional workforce to retain the living standards comes into contradiction with existing 
quotas of immigration policy. 
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European policy of respecting civil society initiatives assumes a significant influence of 
non-governmental organizations on policy-making. In particularly, the opinion of trade unions 
always played an important role in labour market regulation. In recent neo-liberal discussions 
the role of trade unions and collective agreements is often put in question as an obstacle for 
flexibilization. 
Policy inconsistencies are serious obstacles for their pursuing. Moreover, in such cases some 
legislation contradictions with unpredictable consequences can occur. It should be 
emphasized that a social explosion which can outbreak due to policy inconsistencies can be 
socially very costly, much surpassing gains from particular policies. The nuclear energy also 
seemed quite cheap before the Chernobyl explosion.     
Need for legislation–taxation–insurance interactions  
The Western rationalism is shaped by logic which goes back to Ancient Greek 
mathematicians and Aristotle. Logic, operating on definitions, axioms and deduction rules, 
made thinking transparent and consistent. Traces of this approach can be found even in 
politics. When the American Declaration of Independence claims “We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights…” it follows the axiomatic way of thinking. J.-J. Roussau’s 
doctrine of natural human rights is another example of political axioms. Juridical laws are 
also a kind of axioms for qualifying cases with logical rules. 
On the other hand, logic is a human invention (with a place of origin — (V)Elia in Italy, date 
of origin — 374 BC, and inventors — Parmenides and Zeno) and has its limitations. For 
instance, it is little adaptable to integrating different elements and finding compromises. 
According to Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy (1946), the admiration by 
logic resulted in a belief that knowledge is a derivate from basic presumptions. The necessity 
in starting points for deduction gave birth to mystical theological dogmas, moreover, delayed 
the development of natural sciences based on empirical knowledge by two millennia till the 
17th century. Jurisdiction also had to overcome shortcomings of rigorous logical thinking. 
Since axioms are never universal, crimes are more or less flexibly penalized within certain 
ranges of fines and lengths of imprisonment. Occurring incompatibilities of logic with 
intuition in complex situations are surmounted by jurors (e.g., in the USA) entitled to 
informal judgments.   
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As one can see, a rigid legislation is not best suited for all cases. In everyday life, however, 
certain actions are allowed but not favored. For instance, smoking is generally authorized but 
prohibited in some places. Immigration is not forbidden but constrained by quotas. Besides, 
there always emerge ambiguous cases which can be hardly linked to existing definitions. The 
Green Paper refers to the unavoidable ambiguity in definitions of workers, employees, and 
self-employed which complicates social policy legislation (European Commission 2006a: 11–
12, 14). 
A general approach to regulating intermediate cases between authorization and prohibition is 
introducing regulatory charges. For instance, alcohol consumption is moderated by high 
prices, industries are stimulated to reduce pollution by environmental taxes, etc. In certain 
situations it can be useful to extend dichotomous Yes/No logic to a continuous scale of 
variable acceptability with non-prohibitive but constraining measures. In a sense, the 
axiomatic approach is complemented with a computational evaluation which reflects the 
degree of compromise. An example of transition from authorization/prohibition to flexible 
regulation is the replacement of the American anti-alcohol prohibition law by imposing 
adjustable alcohol taxes.  
The difficulty in designing new labour laws is just a low adaptability of dichotomous Yes/No 
logical schemata to favoring/constraining flexible employment with all imaginable 
intermediate forms. The legislative regulation would be much easier if the degree of 
employment flexibility could be evaluated for each particular case by certain rules and, 
eventually, implemented in an indicator of flexibility. Such an evaluation could be used as an 
eligibility criterion to social security benefits, like the personal/family situation is used as a 
tax liability criterion. Moreover, bridging legislation with taxation, one can introduce 
progressive flexibilization taxes instead of usual prohibition/authorization rules.  
Progressive charges to constrain dismissals are already used in the American unemployment 
insurance based on the so called experience rating (Graser 1999). The experience rating is the 
frequency of dismissals in the enterprise which determines the employer's contributions to 
unemployment insurance: the more frequent dismissals, the higher the contributions. Graser 
(2002: 391) draws analogy to motor insurance which price is influenced by the frequency of 
accidents. Being regarded from our viewpoint, the American practice has two important 
properties: (1) it operates on the financially fair risk-compensation basis, and (2) constrains 
the general dismissal freedom of the employer. 
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Another example of bridging legislation with taxation/insurance is provided by the Austrian 
Severance Act 2002 (Abfertigungsrecht) recognized to be a good practice both by the 
European Commission (2006a: 10) and the OECD (2006: 99). Now the severance payment is 
accumulated throughout the whole career of employees at special severance accounts which 
are accessible upon dismissals or retirement. Employers make obligatory contributions to 
these accounts of 1.53% of salaries paid and are no longer charged with severance payments 
in case of dismissals. Since dismissals were relatively easy in Austria, severance pay was the 
major constraint, especially for small enterprises with tight budget. After the reform, 
dismissals became a quite formal procedure, and employers got freedom to make quick labour 
force adjustments for the flat 1.53%-'flexibilization tax'. 
Regarded from the employees' viewpoint, the new Austrian Abfertigungsrecht is rather a kind 
of firing insurance. As argued by the European Commission (2006a: 10), its advantage is that 
a benevolent change of a job does not mean loosing the severance entitlement for a long 
tenure: "The new rules allow workers to leave when they find alternative employment rather 
than stay in a particular job for fear of losing the accompanying severance payment". 
Certainly, it is questionable whether this factual flexibilization of employment relations with 
all the negative consequences already discussed — bad career prospects and complications of 
family life — is really compensated by no fear of loosing a long-tenure severance award.  
In the German debate the instrument of severance pay is linked to the employment protection 
legislation. The bottle-neck is not the reform of severance pay itself but its suggested role as 
to replace the remaining employment protection legislation. The severance pay, being a part 
of employment protection cannot replace the whole of it, even if the severance pay has been 
made more generous and eligibility conditions have been extended. The Austrian reform is in 
fact a one-sided enhancement of flexibilization with cosmetic social advantages; see Bothfeld 
and Zeibig (2006). 
Thus, there are precedents of bridging labour law with insurance/taxation forms. Developing 
this many-sided approach promises wider opportunities than just modernising labour law 
alone. 
Towards efficient steering instruments   
The shortcoming of the American experience rating is that the risk of becoming unemployed 
is linked to dismissals only, regardless of the length and other particularities of the working 
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contract. In fact, the risk of unemployment is higher for temporarily rather than for 
permanently employed. 
The Austrian reform has the weakness that it is case-independent and thereby does not 
constrain firings. The interests of employers are little affected by dismissals, because they are 
seldom charged with severance payments extra to the obligatory social contributions. Besides, 
all the increasing social expenditures for unfairly dismissed are carried by the statuary social 
security.  
A possible instrument to implement flexicurity with fewer disadvantages mentioned could be 
flexinsurance together with elements of the basic minimum income model. 
The flexinsurance assumes that the employer’s contribution to social security should be 
proportional to the flexibility of the contract/risk of becoming unemployed (Tangian 2005). 
The idea is the same as in health insurance. If unemployment is regarded as a social disease 
then both sick leave and treatment should be insured. The compensation for sick leave 
corresponds to passive measures — unemployment benefits, and the medical treatment 
corresponds to active labour market policy measures — professional training, job creation, 
and others. Similarly to (private) health insurance — the higher the risks (age, chronic 
diseases), the higher monthly charges, — the flexinsurance assumes that the lower the 
employment status (short period, weak perspectives), the higher contributions to social 
security.  
The flexinsurance has the following advantages: 
• A higher risk of atypical employees to become unemployed is compensated, and 
contributions to social security are made adequate. The responsibility for the income 
of unemployed is not transferred to the state but recovered by corresponding insurance 
contributions. 
• The amount of social security contributions is conditioned by the type of contract and 
thereby affects employers. For instance, an employer, being interested in reducing 
labour costs, is motivated to issue a permanent contract rather than to prolong a 
temporary one. Thereby, progressive contributions stimulate employers to hire 
employees more favourably, but without rigidly restricting the labour market 
flexibility. 
• Flexinsurance can be a flexible instrument for 'regulating the labour market 
deregulation'. Its updating needs no legislation changes but just administrative 
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decisions. It is similar to periodic adjustments of statutory health insurance 
contributions which are changed almost every year. On the contrary, launching new 
laws can take several years of preparations in governmental commissions and hearings 
in the parliament.  
The basic minimum income model assumes a flat income paid by the state to all residents 
regardless of their earnings and property status (Keller and Seifert 2005: 320); for pros and 
cons see Schaefer (2006). Traces of this model appear in some social security branches like 
child care allowances or old-age provisions. For instance, Kindergeld in Germany is paid to 
all parents. Some basic minimum options are practiced in Switzerland for retirement 
(Brombacher-Steiner 2000). In a sense, the conception of basic minimum income is 
incorporated in the minimum wage (Schulten et al 2006). The additional budget expenditures 
for the basic minimum income can be covered by  
• higher taxes of high-earners (to subtract the flat income),  
• flexinsurance, and 
• funds released from reducing the number of civil servants currently working in social 
security (since the system becomes much more simple).  
As we show next, flexinsurance and elements of basic minimum income model resolve 
contradictions between some of the European policies enumerated previously.  
European welfare policy. The basic minimum income model meets the concept of welfare 
state since it guarantees some unconditional living standards and discharges social tension.  
Flexicurity. The basic minimum income model means a significant progress in social security 
and therefore meets the idea of the flexicurity trade-off: 'more security for more flexibility'. At 
the same time, flexinsurance can contribute to 'softly' regulating flexibilization to keep the 
situation at the flexicurity trade-off.  
Make work pay. Since the basic minimum model guarantees statutory payments regardless 
of income, moving to work means a pure profit. There can be no situations when moving to 
work is little attractive due to losing out-of-work benefits. On the other hand, the lack of 
social benefits excludes their penalty cuts. The penalty measures of the policy 'make work 
pay' are replaced by a more efficient benevolent motivation (cf .with A. Carnegie's 'There is 
no way to force somebody to do something other than to make to wish it'). Thereby the 'make 
work pay' policy gains from the measures proposed and becomes compatible with flexicurity. 
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Respecting civil society initiatives. Introducing flexinsurance means respecting the trade-
unionist position on constraining the total deregulation of labour markets. Besides, the basic 
minimum income guarantees that unemployed are not so poor that they are ready to accept 
any job offer, and thereby will not become 'strike breakers' in the long-running trade union 
struggle for good working conditions and fair pay.  
The last but not least factor in preserving the European welfare state is constraining the 
openness of European financial markets. In fact, easy foreign investments actually mean 
easily moving jobs from Europe to other countries. As already mentioned, employers have a 
legal instrument to make pressure on European governments: 'If you do not relax employment 
protection according to our requirements we shall move jobs abroad'. Thereby, having 
liberalized finances, European governments paved the way to losing control over labour 
markets. Since the exit is usually where the entrance was, to get the control back, the financial 
markets have to be somewhat constrained. Certainly, if social priorities are respected 
sincerely and consistently. 
Methodological advances and monitoring instruments 
Although flexicurity is getting to be adopted as a European policy, there exists neither its 
established definition, nor even an unambiguous idea of it, to say nothing of steering and 
monitoring instruments. The chapter on flexicurity in Employment in Europe by the European 
Commision (2006c) lacks any ‘official’ definition but refers to the one by Wilthagen and Tros 
(2004) and benchmark countries with the OECD partial indicators of social security. Neither 
is flexicurity defined in the Green Paper but used first with quotation marks twice in p. 4 and 
afterwards without. The major questions to be discussed at the Expert meeting on flexicurity 
strategies and the implications of their adoption at the European level on the occasion of 
German–Portugal–Slovenian presidency in the EU organized by the Portugal government in 
Lisbon on September 25, 2006, were just on definitions and monitoring instruments. That is, 
the policy to be adopted at the European level is still ill-defined and supported by no 
empirical feedback (Tangian 2006).  
An operational definition of flexicurity and related composite indicators were developed at the 
Hans-Böckler Foundation (Tangian 2005–2006). They were applied to investigate the 10-year 
dynamics of 16 European countries, basing on data available form European Commission, 
Eurostat, and OECD. The results are not encouraging. Contrary to theoretical opinions and 
political promises, the current deregulation of European labour markets is not adequately 
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compensated by improvements in social security. Flexibilization resulted in an increase of 
unemployment and in a disproportional growth of the number of atypically employed 
(Eurostat 2005, Schmid and Gazier 2002, Seifert and Tangian 2006). The average 
employment status in the society decreases, on the average disqualifying employees from 
social security benefits, even in the background of some institutional improvements. 
To give an idea of the interaction of institutional and flexibilization factors consider an 
example. Suppose that there are two groups of unemployed, with a high former employment 
status (recently normally employed, unfairly dismissed) who get 700 EUR a month (90%), 
and with a low former employment status (flexibly employed, long-term unemployed, etc.) 
who get 300 EUR a month (10%), giving the national average aid 700*0.9 + 300*0.1 = 660 
EUR/month. Let there be a 10%-increase of aid for all, but due to flexibilization the first 
group is reduced to 50% and the second increases up to 50%. Then the national average is 
770*0.5 + 330*0.5 = 550 EUR/month. Thus, regardless of general institutional improvement 
by 10% the national average decreases due to flexibilization from 660 to 550 EUR/month (= 
by 16.6%). 
After the flexicurity advantages/disadvantages have been accounted proportionally to the size 
of the groups affected, the trends of average national figures turn out to be rather 
disappointing. The same conclusions are obtained with three models: 
• in the neo-liberal perspective, that is, under the assumption that labour rights are 
tradable for social security benefits, 
• from the viewpoint of trade-unions, that is, under the assumption that labour rights are 
not tradable for social security benefits, so that flexicurity is understood as a better 
social protection of flexibly employed, and 
• by tracing the development of the European welfare state, that is, by evaluating the 
national average of the coverage of unemployed by social security.  
Thus, the declared balance between advantages and disadvantages is illusory, because gains 
are smaller than losses and winners are fewer than losers. To repair the actual situation, the 
flexibilization should be constrained on the one hand, and, on the other hand, social security 
rules should be urgently updated. 
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Conclusions 
It should not be hoped that the great challenge of labour market structural change can be 
answered by minor reforms. The level of reform should correspond to the level of change. 
Otherwise, the situation will be similar to the one mocked by Saltykov-Shchzedrin (1826–
1889): 'How to make an unprofitable enterprise profitable, not changing anything in it?' 
Side-by-side with Danish/Dutch flexicurity and Austrian Abfertigungsrecht, the package of 
measures proposed (flexinsurance, basic minimum income, and constraining the openness of 
financial markets) are aimed at solving the current social and policy contradictions in the 
European Union. 
To keep the policy under operational control, advanced monitoring tools and easily adjustable 
steering instruments are needed. 
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 Thoughts to the 14 questions posed by the Green Paper 
1. What would you consider to be the priorities for a meaningful labour law reform 
agenda?  
As long as the real need for flexibilization remains an open question, it may be 
reasonable just to introduce flexible easily adjustable and reversible regulatory 
measures like flexinsurance. The flexinsurance assumes that the employer’s 
contribution to social security should be proportional to the flexibility of the 
contract/risk of becoming unemployed. The idea is the same as in health 
insurance; see pp. 20–21 for more details.  
 
2. Can the adaptation of labour law and collective agreements contribute to improved 
flexibility and employment security and a reduction in labour market segmentation? If 
yes, then how?  
It looks rather impossible to attain the both goals, flexibility and employment 
security, simultaneously. In actuality these targets represent contradictory 
interests of different social partners, see pp. 13–15. It may be possible to speak 
of a compromise only. The flexinsurance proposed can be regarded as an 
instrument for its adjustment. Under flexinsurance, employers are motivated to 
improve in the employment status of the employees due to lower social 
contributions. Employees are encouraged to accept flexible work which offers 
more generous social security benefits in such cases (by analogy with better 
hospital conditions for those who pay higher contributions). 
 
3. Do existing regulations, whether in the form of law and/or collective agreements, 
hinder or stimulate enterprises and employees seeking to avail of opportunities to 
increase productivity and adjust to the introduction of new technologies and changes 
linked to international competition? How can improvements be made in the quality of 
regulations affecting SMEs (= small and medium enterprises), while preserving their 
objectives? 
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The question assumes that adopting innovations may need firing employees 
with outdated skills, and that it can be too costly for small enterprises charged 
with severance payments. However, it is not self-evident that innovations 
imply firing. In fact, innovations themselves result in higher competitiveness 
and, consequently, higher profits which should be sufficient to compensate 
expenses for professional training and/or creating a few jobs for new tasks. In 
fact, firms are seeking for double profits both from innovations and reducing 
labour costs. These double profits will unlikely be fairly distributed within the 
firms, but rather will increase the inequality between low- and high-paid 
personnel, contrary to the concept of welfare state; see also pp. 13–15. 
 
4. How might recruitment under permanent and temporary contracts be facilitated, 
whether by law or collective agreement, so as to allow for more flexibility within the 
framework of these contracts while ensuring adequate standards of employment 
security and social protection at the same time? 
The formulation of the question is misleading because it assumes by default 
that flexibilization is necessary (see critics in p. 7). If flexibilization is regarded 
as a disadvantage for employees, the only way to facilitate the recruitment of 
flexibly employed is to provide them with some additional advantages. For 
instance, the flexinsurance can guarantee better social security benefits for 
flexibly employed. The idea is the same as of additional health insurance 
options for those who are exposed to additional risks.   
 
5. Would it be useful to consider a combination of more flexible employment protection 
legislation and well-designed assistance to the unemployed, both in the form of 
income compensation (i.e. passive labour market policies) and active labour market 
policies? 
In fact the question is about the usefulness of passive and/or active security 
measures under a flexible employment protection legislation. Two measures 
are better than one, so a combination of several social security measures is 
more flexible itself and, consequently, provide more possibilities. 
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6. What role might law and/or collective agreements negotiated between the social 
partners play in promoting access to training and transitions between different 
contractual forms for upward mobility over the course of a fully active working life? 
The flexinsurance suggests, among other things, stimulating the upward 
mobility of employees, that is, transitions from part-time to full-time work, or 
from fixed term to permanent contracts. Professional training and transitions 
between different contractual forms can be negotiated by social partners to be 
accounted in the flexinsurance as bonus points.  
 
7. Is greater clarity needed in Member States' legal definitions of employment and self-
employment to facilitate bona fide transitions from employment to self-employment 
and vice versa? 
Definition clarity alone can hardly facilitate mobility between employment and 
self-employment. Most important are the economical consequences linked to 
the definitions of employment and self-employment. Transitions from 
employment to self-employment can be facilitated if self-employed have the 
same social security benefits as regular employees. 
  
8. Is there a need for a “floor of rights” dealing with the working conditions of all 
workers regardless of the form of their work contract? What, in your view, would be 
the impact of such minimum requirements on job creation as well as on the protection 
of workers? 
The very idea of the 'floor of rights for working conditions' goes in line with 
the idea of minimal wage and, finally, with human rights in general.  
 
9. Do you think the responsibilities of the various parties within multiple employment 
relationships should be clarified to determine who is accountable for compliance with 
employment rights? Would subsidiary liability be an effective and feasible way to 
establish that responsibility in the case of sub-contractors? If not, do you see other 
ways to ensure adequate protection of workers in "three-way relationships"? 
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Particular working conditions at the workplace are beyond the scope of the 
paper. As for the social security contributions, flexinsurance makes possible a 
shared responsibility for multiple-way relationships. Each employer should be 
charged with a certain percentage of social contributions according to the 
contractual agreement between employers involved.  
 
10. Is there a need to clarify the employment status of temporary agency workers? 
Every status should be clarified, to avoid both misunderstanding and misuse. 
Again, the definition alone with no economic consequences makes not much 
sense. The social guarantees linked to this definition should be specified. It 
seems fair to compensate the inconveniences of agency work (frequent changes 
of workplace, adaptation efforts to new tasks and teams) by higher social 
guarantees. 
 
11. How could minimum requirements concerning the organization of working time be 
modified in order to provide greater flexibility for both employers and employees, 
while ensuring a high standard of protection of workers' health and safety? What 
aspects of the organization of working time should be tackled as a matter of priority 
by the Community? 
The question is beyond the scope of the paper. As for flexinsurance, 
inconvenient flexibility of working time can be, among other things, 
compensated by better social guarantees (accounted, for instance, as insurance 
bonus factors).  
 
12. How can the employment rights of workers operating in a transnational context, 
including in particular frontier workers, be assured throughout the Community? Do 
you see a need for more convergent definitions of 'worker' in EU Directives in the 
interests of ensuring that these workers can exercise their employment rights, 
regardless of the Member State where they work? Or do you believe that Member 
States should retain their discretion in this matter? 
 30
If the Unites States of Europe are on the agenda then a common definition of 
(transnational) worker with economical/social security consequences should be 
on the agenda as well.   
 
13. Do you think it is necessary to reinforce administrative co-operation between the 
relevant authorities to boost their effectiveness in enforcing Community labour law? 
Do you see a role for social partners in such cooperation? 
An administrative cooperation should run, but there is no urgency in an abrupt 
enforcing Community labour law as long as Member States have considerable 
national differences and specific traditions of industrial relations.  
 
14. Do you consider that further initiatives are needed at an EU level to support action by 
the Member States to combat undeclared work? 
Prohibitive legislation should be accompanied by economic measures. In the 
background of high unemployment workers consider undeclared work to be 
'better than nothing'. Another fundamental problem is the wage differences 
between countries, so that an undeclared work in Germany can be better paid 
than a declared work in Poland. Therefore, measures against high 
unemployment and wage differences can be even more efficient than 
legislation prohibitions.  
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